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The name of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
has been on thousands of lips around the globe in recent months. The
Organization's initials-OPEC-have filled thousands of newspaper
pages the world over. To the people in the oil-importing countries, the
word OPEC is a frightening one, reminding them of high oil prices,
gas station lines and fuel shortages. OPEC has been called many
names, the nicest of them being "international cartel;" it has been
accused of many things, the mildest of them being "monopoly pric-
ing.'" Yet few of OPEC's critics, and fewer of its followers, know what
OPEC really is or what its purposes are. Briefly, OPEC is an associa-
tion of twelve full-member plus one associate-member countries, ded-
icated to the protection of their national interests in the production
and export of oil. OPEC was originally established by five oil-
producing countries as a "mouvement de resistance" (defense league)
against arbitrary and unilateral decisions of the major oil companies.
At this point, a bit of oil price history is highly illuminating. In
1947 the "posted price," or the price on which royalties and taxes are
based, of a barrel of Persian crude was $2.17. During the 1950's, while
other prices were rising, the oil price was stable or on the decline. In
February 1959, the "posted price" of Persian Gulf crude was officially
lowered by the major oil companies, who gave as their reason a glut
in world oil supply, to $1.90 a barrel. The oil exporters, who were
economically poor and politically divided, could not and did not do
anything to stop these losses per barrel. Instead, the exporters strove
for increased output to maintain their total income. The companies,
in turn, lowered the price to $1.80 in August 1960. Of this, 80 cents
was the exporter's share. 2 Since most of the exporters were depending
principally on oil income for their foreign exchange needs, the compa-
nies' disregard of these needs and the exporters' other aspirations
resulting from repeated reduction of oil prices served as the turning
point in the history of OPEC.
* Ambassador-at-Large and Chief of the Iranian Economic Mission in Washing-
ton, D.C.
1. For the history and background of OPEC see Z. MIKDASHI, THE COMMUNITY OF
OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES (1972).
2. Hearings on S. Res. 40 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt.1, at 437 (1969). Another source puts oil prices at
$2.22 per barrel for 1947. H. FRANK, CRUDE On. PRICES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 30 (1966).
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The five countries involved (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
and Venezuela) formed OPEC in September 1960. Later, Algeria,
Ecuador, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates joined the group. Gabon was recently accepted as an asso-
ciate member. OPEC's victories were hard and long in coming. De-
spite the members' resolve to prevent an oil price decline, the coun-
tries' policy of unrestrained production to obtain larger revenues and
foreign exchange kept pushing prices down. These policies were im-
posed on the countries by the companies against the exporters long-
term interests, and against technical requirements for prudent and
efficient exploitation. Although the official posted price, under OPEC
pressure, remained at $1.80 a barrel throughout the 1960's, significant
discounts (of 40 cents to 55 cents a barrel from the posted price on
the producers' own offtake) were not unusual. A barrel of offtake
crude was often sold by the Persian Gulf producers at $1.25 in the
world markets-with the prospects of the blissful "$1.00 a barrel"
gleefully contemplated by the companies and net oil-importers.
3
Then, success came suddenly. Following the Caracas Resolution
of December 1970,1 a conference was held in Tehran between OPEC
representatives and those of the oil majors in February 1971. After a
series of long and difficult negotiations, an agreement was reached
whereby the posted price was increased to $2.30, and provisions were
made for (a) small annual increases in that price, and (b) allowance
for inflation in the major oil importing countries.5 With this signifi-
cant triumph in hand, other successes followed. In January 1972, a
new concession was obtained by the oil exporters in terms of adjust-
ment allowances in their incomes (received in U.S. dollars) against
dollar devaluations.' In March 1972, the principle of "participation"
by producer-governments in the operation of the oil companies was
accepted. 7 In October 1973, after weeks of unsuccessful negotiations
with the companies, the oil-exporting governments declared their
intention to establish oil prices among themselves, free from the ob-
structionist tactics of the companies in bilateral bargaining.8 The
3. FRANK, supra note 2, at 116.
4. OPEC Resolution XXI. 120 Calling for Negotiations and Forming Three-
Member Negotiating Committees, Dec. 1970, 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 240-42 (1971).
5. Tehran Agreement Between Six Gulf States and Oil Companies Operating in
Their Territories, Feb. 14, 1971, 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 247-54 (1971). Thus between
1947 and 1972 the posted price of crude oil in the Middle East rose only from $2.17 to
$2.30. When inflation is taken into account, the real price was actually fifteen percent
lower over twenty-five years.
6. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries: Agreement Between Oil Com-
panies and Six Persian Gulf States on Increased Payments, Jan. 20, 1972, 11 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 554-60 (1972).
7. See L. MOSLEY, POWER PLAY: OIL IN THE MIDDLE EAST 388-411 (1973).
8. N. Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1973, at 16, col. 1.
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posted price was raised to $5.11,1 and finally, in December 1973, when
the crude oil auction price in the free market had risen to over $22 a
barrel, the posted price in the Persian Gulf was raised to $11.65 a
barrel. 0
II. REASONS FOR THE RISE OF OPEC
The intriguing question is: How could OPEC, which for ten long
years had been largely helpless in promoting the interests of its mem-
bers, suddenly succeed in bringing the oil majors to their senses, so
to speak, and in making the whole world take notice of the Organiza-
tion's aims and strengths? The answer lies in a multitude of forces,
long in the making, which have suddenly converged on the scene.
Eight interrelated factors can be distinguished as contributing to
OPEC's recent rise in prominence.
The first factor relates to a change in the world's basic balance
of politico-economic power. The nature and source of OPEC's bar-
gaining strength in dealing with the major oil consuming nations and
the oil majors are a part of this change in the global power equa-
tion-a reflection of the growing power and independence of the
Third World. The essence of world power in the last two decades has
undergone two fundamental changes: (a) away from originally bi-
polar, and later triangular, hegemony of the Super Powers; and (b)
in favor of the less-developed countries (LDC's). International bar-
gaining, a dynamic process, has thus undergone significant changes
in its participants, its scope, and its dimensions. The bargaining
leverage possessed by OPEC is a manifestation of the emergence of
the Third World as a Third Force."
Several basic features of this new global power equation can be
easily underlined. The new U.S.-U.S.S.R. detente, for example, has
ushered in greater tolerance by both major powers of neutralism, non-
alignment, and the pursuit of political independence; non-alignment
no longer necessarily connotes hostility toward the left or the right.
Then, there has been a multilateralization of power bases, following
the rise of Japan and the EEC to the position of Super Powers in the
world. Furthermore, new international politico-economic alliances
have been formed on the basis of functional and geographical rather
than political and ideological considerations. For example, the Soviet
Union and the United States have entered into a number of technical,
cultural, scientific and even economic treaties and relationships with
countries possessing different political ideologies. The membership
9. N. Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1973, at 61, col. 1.
10. N. Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
11. For a succinct analysis of the new developments see S. BROWN, THE CHANGING
EssENCE OF POWER (1973) and G. BERGSTEN, THE THREAT FROM THE THIRD WORLD
(1973).
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composition of such international bodies as UNCTAD, GATT, the
Arab League, and the Organization of African States, groupings in
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and other
similar mixtures present vivid examples of pragmatic and apolitical
coalitions.
These criss-cross coalitions have been stimulated and fostered by
the Super Powers' need for votes in various international forums
which, in turn, have stimulated and nurtured the emergence of the
Third World as a significant force favoring cooperation rather than
coercion in international relations. "Gunboat diplomacy" has been
gradually replaced by relatively polite official debates and skillful
informal lobbying in the corridors of international agencies. Finally,
the emergence of the People's Republic of China as the new champion
of the Third World has significantly strengthened the LDC's hand in
their bargaining with the richer countries.
The second factor responsible for OPEC's rising power and influ-
ence has been the geopolitical strength of the OPEC members. For
example, six major OPEC countries are located around the Persian
Gulf, a strategic area for all Super Powers. The Soviet Union's his-
toric desire for access to the warm waters of the Gulf and the Indian
Ocean," the United States' special commitments to the State of Is-
rael plus her vast investments in the Middle East oil fields, and Sino-
Soviet rivalry in this part of the world for its own sake and as a
gateway to Africa-all have given the Persian Gulf region its geopolit-
ical significance.
The third factor operating in OPEC's favor has been the Organi-
zation's control over oil reserves and exports on the one hand, and the
industrial countries' dependence upon imported petroleum on the
other. By 1985, more than half of world energy consumption (esti-
mated at 145 million b/d of oil equivalent) will be supplied by crude
petroleum. Considering that more than sixty per cent of the world's
proven oil reserves and about eighty-five per cent of world oil exports
are in OPEC's hands, the Organization's actual and potential clout
is not difficult to recognize.'"
The fourth factor accounting for OPEC's mounting significance
and power is solidarity among the exporting countries. History re-
cords many exporting organizations of bygone days which faded away
in a short span of time due to short-sightedness, secretive competi-
tion, and the pursuit of "beggar-my-neighbor" policies. In the case
of OPEC, however, in spite of differences in ideology and political
12. In this connection see L. LANDIS, POLmCS AND OIL: MOSCOW IN THE MIDDLE
EAST (1973).
13. R. MILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF ENERGY: WHAT WENT WRONG AND How WE CAN
Fix IT (1974).
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philosophy among member countries, there has been a strong har-
mony of economic action among members, a harmony which has
remained largely immune to countervailing maneuvers of both the
big oil companies and the consuming nations.1 4 Above all, OPEC's
leadership has remained in the hands of moderate countries which
have succeeded in avoiding useless and unproductive confrontations
with the consuming nations.
The fifth element underlying OPEC's success has been the exist-
ence of conflicting interests among certain major consuming coun-
tries, despite their similar political philosophies and orientations.
OPEC members, notwithstanding their dissimilar political regimes,
have found it advantageous to follow certain common economic goals.
Western Europe, the United States, and Japan, on the other hand,
continue to follow what they themselves call "cannibalistic competi-
tion" in the economic arena. The United States, primarily relying on
its own relatively rich domestic oil resources, 5 has recently vowed to
follow a policy aimed at self-sufficiency by 1980. The United States'
policies and prospects are thus vastly different from Japan's, a coun-
try which is totally dependent on foreign oil. In case of an emergency,
the United States can maintain her levels of employment, income,
and living reasonably well by adopting energy-saving policies which
might necessitate only small sacrifices on the part of her people. But
without foreign oil the Japanese economy would be in total chaos.
The economic interests of EEC members also vary. England hopes to
attain self-sufficiency and an exporting position in oil by 1980, a hope
which cannot be shared by her other partners in the Community.
Italy, France and Germany have thus found it necessary to follow
their own national self-interest in attempting to obtain long-term
supplies of foreign petroleum."6
The sixth element contributing to OPEC's strength has been the
greater self-confidence among members as a result of a series of con-
secutive successes in the international economic scene. The expres-
sion "nothing succeeds like success" has never been more clearly
manifested than in this case. OPEC members had endeavored to
14. See MOSLEY, supra note 7, at 388-411; Mikdashi, Cooperation Among Oil
Exporting Countries with Special Reference to Arab Countries, 28 INT'L Oao. 1, 9-10
(1974). For examples of discord among OPEC countries see Mikdashi, supra note 1,
at 12-17 and Note, From Concession to Participation: Restricting the Middle East Oil
Industry, 48 N. Y. U. L. REV. 774, 791-93 (1973).
15. Even during the economic boom of 1972-73, only one-third of the United
States' oil consumption was imported, but the figure for Japan was close to 100 per-
cent.
16. The virtual abandonment of the Netherlands by other EEC countries in the
face of the Arab oil embargo after October 1973 is another example of European
disunity when national interests are at stake.
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obtain their due shares since 1960, but their early setbacks in negotia-
tions with oil companies repeatedly weakened their hand. Then they
had their first success in February 1971 under the guidance and lead-
ership of Iran's Shahanshah. From then on, one success led to an-
other. The 1971 victory provided not only the psychological self-
confidence needed by OPEC negotiators, but also the politico-
economic underpinnings for future bargains. Once assured of their
annual foreign exchange needs, the oil producers could negotiate from
a position of financial strength and ultimately political power.
The seventh factor leading to OPEC's successful negotiations
with the oil companies' skilled and sophisticated negotiators has been
the ample supply of indigenous talent from the oil-producing coun-
tries. The exporter's representatives today are a group of well-
informed and experienced individuals who fully match their Western
counterparts in political skill and bargaining ability. They are
equipped not only with their own courage and their governments' full
support, but with reams of statistics and a number of arguments
carefully selected and meticulously worked out by their technical and
professional deputies. Oil bargaining sessions are no longer an exer-
cise in favors humbly requested by the producers and magnanimously
bestowed on them by the oil majors. The relationships are now condi-
tioned by sovereign states bent on optimizing returns from their ex-
haustible resources and their customers. The West and the oil compa-
nies have come to understand these facts, and their relations with the
Third World and the oil producers have significantly changed.17
The eighth factor responsible for OPEC's remarkable recent
achievements has been the developing governments' success in fol-
lowing independent national policies free from the insidious influ-
ences of the oil companies or their governments. The majority of the
people in the Third World have obtained greater confidence in their
leaders now, and are willing to endure greater sacrifices to ensure the
attainment of their national goals. At the same time, the political and
administrative influence of the oil majors over both their own govern-
ments and those of the producing countries has considerably dimin-
ished. I"
The success in oil negotiations and the acquisition of substan-
tially vast sums of revenues have enabled national leaders in the oil-
producing nations not only to give their people greater material
amenities and increased economic welfare, but to prove to them their
leadership ability and governing capacity. The rank and file, in turn,
have not only become relatively more comfortable and thus more
17. R. VICKER, THE KINGDOM OF OIL/THE MIDDLE EAST: ITS PEOPLE AND ITS POWER
(1974).
18. MOSLEY, supra note 7.
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content; they have come to believe, more and more, their leaders'
promises of higher material standards of living and enhanced na-
tional political prestige for their countries. This increased popular
support has, in turn, strengthened the leadership's hand, allowing
them to stand up to foreign politico-economic pressures and to resist
oil company dictates.
11. THE WEAPONS OF OPEC
Having discussed the foundations of OPEC's economic strength
and political power, we may consider the means through which this
politico-economic power can be used in negotiating with interna-
tional oil companies and Western consuming countries. The so-called
"weapons" in OPEC's hands can be classified into two categories: (1)
negative sanctions, and (2) positive stiumuli, which can be used al-
ternatively vis-a-vis foreign interests. In resisting intolerable de-
mands or intransigences of the oil-importing countries or companies,
OPEC members may retaliate by resorting to such negative sanctions
as:
1. Withholding part or all of the oil supply from all
or selected customers through (a) nationalization or threat
of take-over of oil and/or other foreign investments, and (b)
temporary embargoes on exports;
2. Using its "embargo" power to demand and receive
increasingly higher prices for crude oil-naturally to the
extent that consumer resistance, the development of sub-
stitutes, and retaliatory measures by the oil importing
countries (e.g., import quotas, foreign investment restric-
tions, denial of aid, and other retaliation) may permit;
3. Regulating domestic operation by foreign oil com-
panies through such requirements as greater local partici-
pation in production and/or distribution; further changes
in internal "value-added" in oil production and market-
ing; and increased local purchases, restricted company
imports, etc.;
4. Switching huge export earnings from some foreign
currencies and countries to others depending on type of
cooperation and attitude, or denying foreign investment in
"hostile" countries;
5. Making discriminatory price concessions, or en-
gaging in unfavorable price discrimination vis-a-vis se-
lected customers, or dumping other export products in
"unfriendly" countries;
6. Retaliating against industrialized creditors by the
repudiation or re-scheduling of foreign debts; and
7. Shifting alliances and coalitions in trade, invest-
ment and military agreements between cooperative and
1974
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non-cooperative nations (including threats of withdrawing
from membership of regional pacts or closing military
bases).
The possibility of using these negative sanctions is only part of
OPEC's strength. Part of its power also resides in the offer of positive
stimuli or incentives for cooperation. These incentives may include
such things as:
1. Giving special concessions to foreign private
investors for the purpose of exploiting domestic national
resources which are outside the scope of existing contracts;
2. Promising cooperation in the reform of interna-
tional monetary, fiscal and trade systems; and
3. Investing in joint ventures for the development of
energy sources and/or other investment projects with coop-
erative and accommodating partners.
These positive and negative "weapons" have been used in the
past and are more likely to be used in the future when circumstances
warrant. Like all destructive weapons, however, the significance of
the negative sanctions lies, partly at least, in their potential deter-
rence rather than actual use.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the very existence and occasional use of
these weapons-even those which are retaliatory in nature-are not
only in the interest of the Third World, but also to the advantage of
the whole international community. The possibility of using the neg-
ative weapons will ensure greater economic justice among the rich
and poor; reduce inferiority complexes of the developing nations (par-
ticularly the previous colonies) when dealing with the industrial
countries; enhance their self-reliance and self-confidence; narrow ex-
isting political, psychological and economic gaps between the large
and small countries; and pave the way for a better world. The produc-
tivity and beneficial prospects of the positive stimuli, in turn, open
up vast horizons of cooperative endeavors between oil producers and
oil consumers in efficient use of fuel supplies and in the search for
newer sources of energy.
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